

# Data and the Aggregate Economy

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**How does this economy work?**

# Economics of Data as Economics of Prediction

- top-5 most valuable U.S. companies are data-intensive
  - ▶ will AI & ML spawn a new data economy?
- what is big data technology about?
  - ▶ **prediction technology**
  - ▶ data-driven innovation is also a way to go! but this is not what big data revolution is about
- can data accumulation *alone* sustain aggregate growth?
  - ▶ hold innovation fixed (as in Solow 1956)
- incorporating data-driven innovation is next

# Overview

- model: recursive framework with data accumulation
  - ▶ transactions generate new data
  - ▶ an evolving world makes old data depreciate
- *decreasing returns*
  - ▶ data cannot sustain growth without technological innovation
- *increasing returns*
  - ▶ when firm is young and data-poor
- applications
  - 1 data poverty traps: entry barriers
  - 2 data barter: initial losses
  - 3 specialization

# A Macro Model of Data

- continuum of competitive firms  $i$
- each firm use  $k_{i,t}$  units of capital to produce  $k_{i,t}^\alpha$  units of goods
- these goods have quality  $A_{i,t}$
- firms take equilibrium price  $P_t$  as given and their quality-adjusted outputs are perfect substitutes

$$P_t = \bar{P} Y_t^{-\gamma},$$

$$Y_t = \int_i A_{i,t} k_{i,t}^\alpha di$$

## Model. Data Improves Good's Quality


- quality depends on chosen production technique  $a_{i,t}$
- firm has one optimal technique:  $\theta_t + \varepsilon_{a,i,t}$ 
  - ▶  $\theta_t$  is AR(1) with param  $\rho$ , innovation  $\eta_t \sim N(\mu, \sigma_\theta^2)$
  - ▶  $\varepsilon_{a,i,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_a^2)$  is unlearnable and i.i.d.

$$A_{i,t} = \bar{A} - (a_{i,t} - (\theta_t + \varepsilon_{a,i,t}))^2$$

- at time  $t$ , the firm obtains  $n_{i,t}$  data points about  $\theta_{t+1}$ 
  - ▶  $n_{i,t} = z_i k_{i,t}^\alpha$
  - ▶ data is a bi-product of production with **data-mining ability**  $z_i$
- each data point  $m \in [1 : n_{i,t}]$  reveals

$$s_{i,t,m} = \theta_{t+1} + \xi_{i,t,m} \quad \text{where} \quad \xi_{i,t,m} \sim N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2).$$

# Data Feedback Loop



# Model. Market for Data

- $\delta_{i,t}$ : amount of data traded by firm  $i$  at time  $t$ 
  - ▶  $\delta_{i,t} > 0$  is data purchases
  - ▶  $\delta_{i,t} < 0$  is data sales
  - ▶ firm can buy or sell, not both
- data price  $\pi_t$  clears the data market
- multi-use data (non-rival): You can sell it and still use it
  - ▶ why isn't all data sold? There must be some cost/regulation
  - ▶  $\iota$ : **fraction of sold data that is lost**
  - ▶ could be privacy restrictions on multiple users, or market power
- data adjustment cost:  $\Psi(\cdot)$  (avoid 1-period convergence)



# A Simple Recursive Solution

- **state variable: stock of knowledge**

$$\Omega_{i,t} \equiv \mathbb{E} \left[ \left( \mathbb{E}[\theta_{i,t} | \mathcal{I}_{i,t}] - \theta_{i,t} \right)^2 | \mathcal{I}_{i,t} \right]^{-1} \quad (\text{posterior precision})$$
$$\mathbb{E}[A_{i,t}] = \bar{A} - \Omega_{i,t}^{-1} - \sigma_a^2 \quad (\text{expected quality})$$

## Lemma

The optimal sequence of capital investment choices  $\{k_{i,t}\}$  solves the recursive problem:

$$V(\Omega_{i,t}) = \max_{k_{i,t}, \delta_{i,t}} P_t \left( \bar{A} - \Omega_{i,t}^{-1} - \sigma_a^2 \right) k_{i,t}^\alpha - \Psi(\Delta\Omega_{i,t+1}) - \pi\delta_{i,t} - rk_{i,t}$$
$$+ \left( \frac{1}{1+r} \right) V(\Omega_{i,t+1})$$

where  $n_{i,t} = z_j k_{i,t}^\alpha$  and (Kalman filter)

$$\Omega_{i,t+1} = \left[ \rho^2 (\Omega_{i,t} + \sigma_a^2)^{-1} + \sigma_\theta^2 \right]^{-1} + (n_{it} + \delta_{it}(\mathbf{1}_{\delta_{it}>0} + \mathbf{1}_{\delta_{it}<0})) \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}$$

# Data Accounting


- $\Omega_t$  is the discounted sum of investments in data
- $V(\Omega_t)$  is the value of data
- $V'(\Omega_t)$  is the marginal value of a unit of data

# Results Overview

- diminishing returns: no long-run growth
- increasing returns
- applications: market for data
  - ▶ data poverty trap
  - ▶ data barter
  - ▶ **specialization**

# Understanding Growth. Data Inflow and Outflow

- **inflow:**  $z_i k_{it}^\alpha \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}$  (# of data points  $\times$  precision)
- **outflow:** data depreciation



- steady state: inflows = outflows  $\rightarrow$  **growth stops**
- how specific is this to our modeling assumptions?

# What if Data-Driven Growth is Sustainable without Data-Driven Innovation?

Consider an arbitrary model where data is used to forecast and this affects output. Growth  $g_t > \underline{g} > 0$  can be sustained only if

## Proposition (Data and Infinite Output)

*perfect forecasts generates infinite output.*


and

## Proposition (Data and Infinite Precision )

*future is perfectly deterministic, for some output relevant parameter.*

- $y_{i,t} \rightarrow \infty \Rightarrow n_{i,t} \rightarrow \infty \Rightarrow \Omega_{i,t} \rightarrow \infty$   
 $\Rightarrow$  zero variance forecasts  $\equiv$  deterministic future

# Decreasing Return. Homogeneous Contemporaneous Firms




- homogeneous firms, grow together:  
knowledge and output grow on a concave path till convergence
- keep homogeneity, but one firm enters steady state of others:  
different dynamics

# Increasing Return. Entry and Trade

Single firm enters a steady state


## Proposition (**Convex Data Flow**)

*There exist parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\bar{P}$ , and a threshold  $\hat{\Omega}$  such that when knowledge is scarce  $\Omega_{it} < \hat{\Omega}$ , net data flow  $d\Omega_{it}$  increases over time.*



# Data Poverty Trap. Does Data Impede Firm Entry?

- one new firm entrant: negative profits, slow catch-up



- S-shaped accumulation of aggregate stock of knowledge



# Data Barter.

## Why Produce At A Loss?

- *barter* means data is “exchanged” for the good
  - ▶ at good price  $P_t = 0$
- lots of data is bartered for services
- data barter arises early in a firm’s life (Proposition 5)
  - ▶ firms produce goods at a loss to generate data:  
 $\partial V_t / \partial \Omega_{i,t} > 0$

# Return to Specialization

- who specializes in using data and producing high quality goods?
- **efficient data producers** do not use data  
instead they specialize in **selling data**
  - ▶ data is their comparative advantage


## Proposition

for  $\gamma$  &  $\alpha$  low,  $\lambda < 1$ , and  $\iota < \bar{\iota}$ , then **knowledge gap** is negative:

$$\Omega_H - \Omega_L < 0$$

# Concentration & Data Specialization

- $\lambda$  measures **concentration**
- $\lambda \uparrow \equiv$  fewer efficient data producers  $\equiv$  high concentration



- efficient data producers specialize more in selling data:  
**emergence of data platforms?**

# Conclusions

- assumptions

- ▶ data raises productivity and is not always perfectly rival
- ▶ “big data” is information used for forecasting

- results

- ▶ diminishing returns to forecast precision in the long run
- ▶ increasing returns when knowledge low: 0 prices and (–) profits
- ▶ returns to specialization: data platforms?

- lots of new directions

- ▶ data-driven innovation and endogenous growth:  $\bar{A}(n_{i,t})$
- ▶ data pricing theory
- ▶ “different” data has “different” degrees of relevance
- ▶ firms dynamics with entry/exit and imperfect competition